

PhD Course in Pragmatics

Cooperative Principle and Implicature

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Introduction:

The basis of Gricean pragmatics is the cooperative principle (CP): “ Make your conversational contribution such as is required , at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” . This general principle is instantiated by a set of Maxims of Conversation that govern rational interchange and bridge the gap between what is said and what is meant. The CP and the maxims represent not sociological generalizations or prescriptions for proper conversational etiquette but baseline presumptions that, by their observance or their apparent violation, generate conversational implicatures.

1. Cooperative principle:

Grice believed that when people communicated they acted rationally and followed a cooperative principle (CP). He did not think that this CP was specific to communication, but that it applied to other cooperative activities, for example baking a cake, or mending a car (Grice, 1989). Grice’s CP stated “[M]ake your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” The success of a conversation depends on the cooperation between interlocutors. Grice (1975) proposes the cooperative principle (CP) as a guidance between the speakers and listeners in conversational interactions. When people are able to fulfill the CP is called observance of maxim. Observance of maxim categorized into four maxims:

➤ Maxim of Quantity:

- Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.
- Do not make it more informative than is required. Give the right amount of information when you talk.

Maxim of quantity emphasizes information. The information should be neither too little, nor too much. Grice (1975) explained that , the participants should make contribution as informative as possible to fulfill maxim quantity.

For example:

- Where is the train station?
- In the next to that hospital.

In the example above , speaker B gives an informative answer. Speaker B answers the question as informative as possible by giving the location of the hospital. B's answer is as informative as required.

➤ **Maxim of Quality:** make your contribution one that is true, specifically:

(1) Do not say what you believe to be false.

(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Be truthful.

Maxim of quality can be defined as truthful as required. Maxim of quality regulates a speaker to be sincere, to be honest in saying something. They have to say something that they believe corresponds to reality. Some speakers like to draw their listener's attention to the fact that they are only saying what they believe to be true, and that they lack adequate evidence.

For example:

A: I will ring you tomorrow afternoon then.

B: Ermm, I shall be there as fast as I know, and in the meantime Have a word with Mum and Dad if they are free. Right, bye bye then sweetheart.

A: bye-bye.

B says that “as far as I know” means that “ B cannot be totally sure if that is true”, so if A rings up and finds B not there, B is protected from accusations of lying by the fact that B did make it clear that B was uncertain. Most listeners assume that speakers are not lying, and most speakers know that.

➤ **Maxims of Relation:** it means that the utterance must be relevant to the topic being discussed. Grice states that to fulfill the maxim of relation,

both speaker and listener of conversation should be relevant with the topic being talk.

For example:

John: How about your score, Jane?

Jane: I got an A.

Here, Jane's utterance fulfils the maxim of relation because her answer is relevant to the topic being discussed.

- **Maxim of Manner:** It obliges speaker's utterance to be perspicuous which is not to be ambiguous, obscure, or disorderly. Levinson states that maxim of manner specifies what participants have to do in order to converse in a maximally efficient, rational, and cooperative way. They should also speak sincerely, relevantly, and clearly, while providing sufficient information.

A: what do you think about drama?

B: I really like the each player. They can play their role as good as possible.

B's answer is categorized as maxim of manner because he can answer the question from his partner about the drama orderly.

Grice believed that speakers obeying the CP should be truthful, informative, relevant, and clear. He did not claim that speakers are always cooperative; nor did he claim that speakers always follow the maxims. Speakers may deliberately or accidentally violate one of the maxims for a number of effects, including lying—a covert violation of the maxim of quality (1), or metaphor—an overt violation of the maxim of quality (1).

3. Categories of Nonobservance of the Conversational Maxims

In his first paper (1975: 49), cited in (Mesthrie: 2001), Grice listed three ways in which participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim: the speaker may flout a maxim, 'violate' a maxim, or 'opt out' of observing a maxim. He later added a fourth category of nonobservance: 'infringing,' a maxim. Several writers since Grice have argued the need for a fifth category—'suspending' a maxim,

3.1 Violating and Flouting a Maxim

Thomas (1995) and Cutting (2002) discuss differences between flouting and violating maxims. A speaker is violating a maxim if there is a likelihood that there are liable to mislead the other person.

If we **violate** a maxim, then we simply fail to follow it. At best, violating a maxim results in being a confusing or uncooperative conversationalist. At worst, violating a maxim involves lying or being intentionally misleading.

If we **flout** a maxim, by contrast, we **blatantly** fail to follow it—we aim to communicate something precisely by making it very obvious that we have chosen not to follow the cooperative principle, and trusting that our audience will draw the intended conclusions.

3.2 Infringing a Maxim

As has been already noted, a speaker who, with no intention of generating an implicature, and with no intention of deceiving, fails to observe a maxim, is said to infringe the maxim. In other words, the nonobservance stems from imperfect linguistic performance, rather than from any desire on the part of the speakers to generate a conversational implicature. This type of nonobservance could occur because the speaker has an imperfect command of the language, or because the speaker's performance is impaired in some way (nervousness, drunkenness, excitement), or because of some cognitive impairment, or simply because the speaker is constitutionally incapable of speaking clearly, to the point, etc.

3.3 Opting Out of a Maxim

A speaker opts out of observing a maxim by indicating unwillingness to cooperate in the way that the maxim requires. Examples of opting out occur frequently in public life, when the speaker cannot, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons, reply in the way normally expected. Alternatively, the speaker may wish to avoid generating a false implicature or appearing uncooperative. Here is an example from a British MP, who had been asked a question about talks he had had with the Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi: Well, honestly, I can't tell you a thing, because what was said to me was told me in confidence.

3.4 Suspending a Maxim

Several writers have suggested that there are occasions when there is no need to opt out of observing the maxims because there are certain events in which there is no expectation on the part of any participant that they will be fulfilled (hence the nonfulfillment does not generate any implicatures). This category is necessary to respond to criticisms of the type made by Keenan (1976), who proposed as a counterexample to Grice's theory of conversational implicature the fact that in the Malagasy Republic participants in talk exchanges 'regularly provide less information than is required by their conversational partner, even though they have access to the necessary information' (Keenan 1976: 70). Keenan's examples do not falsify Grice's theory if they are seen as instances where the maxim of quantity is suspended. There is no expectation at all on the part of interactants that speakers will provide precise information about their relatives and friends, in case they draw the attention of evil spirits to them. Although the Malagasy may appear to be underinformative at the level of what is said, the uninformativeness is nevertheless systematic, motivated, and generates implicatures which are readily interpretable by members of that community.

Suspensions of the maxims may be culture-specific (as in Keenan's examples) or specific to particular events. For example, in most cultures, the maxim of quantity appears to be selectively suspended in, for example, courts of law, committees of inquiry, or indeed in any confrontational situation where it is held to be the job of the investigator to elicit the truth from a witness. The witnesses are not required or expected to volunteer information which may incriminate them, and no inference is drawn on the basis of what they do not say .

The notion of Implicatures:

The notion of implicature was first introduced by Herbert Paul Grice (1967). He explains that implicature deals with something beyond what is said by particular speaker. Thomas (1995) adds that Grice's theory is attempting at describing how a hearer obtains from what is said to what is meant. How a hearer tries to understand particular utterance from the level of expressed meaning to the level of implied meaning.

Gazdar (1979) defines Implicature is anything that is inferred from an utterance but that is not a condition for the truth of utterance. Levinson (1981, p.98) adds the

notion of implicature assures to convey the breach between what is literally said and what is essentially said. Furthermore, Levinson (1981) states that Implicatures are surmised based on the assumption that the speaker observes or flouts some principle of cooperation.

However, implicature is that it provides some explicit account of how it is possible to mean (in some general sense) more than what is actually 'said' (i.e. more than what is literally expressed by the conventional sense of the linguistic expressions uttered) (Levinson, 1991: 97). To have a better understanding of this, the followings are examples of speech where the differences happened.

(1) A: What time is it?

B: The newspaper has not arrived yet.

Structural-conventionally, both sentences seem unrelated. However, actually there are extralinguistic factors involved in reconstructing the sentences. If the sentences are extended, it will be like the following.

(3) A: (could you tell me) what time is it (as it is shown in the watch, and if you could please tell me).

(4) B: (I don't know exactly what time it is now, but I can tell you a habit where you can guess what time it is, that is) the newspaper (commonly delivered) has not arrived yet. In the conversation above, the information of answer required is not given directly and completely in the dialogue (1), but the statement given in (2) can be understood by the asking person. Hence, the speaker (2) can only guess about what time the newspaper comes. This guessing should be based on the context, which includes the issues, interlocutors and their background (Nadar, 2009: 60). The difference between (1) and (2) is quite large and cannot be explained by using conventional theory of semantics. To solve these problems we need a system, and the concept of conversational implicature is the solution. Grice divides implicature into Conventional implicature and Nonconventional implicature (Conversational implicature).

Thomas (1995) suggests that both of them have an additional of meaning away from the semantic meaning had by particular utterance. Furthermore, he adds that conversational and conventional implicature are different in the case of context.

In conversational implicature, what is implied is varied based on the context of utterance. On the other hand, what is implied in conventional implicature is just the same apart from the context.

Gillian Brown (2012:31) said “The term implicature uses by Grice to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest or mean, as distinct from what speaker literally says.” Based on the description of the implicature can be said that implicature is part of the pragmatics and have characteristics most comes from conventional speech produced by the speakers and interlocutor in a certain context and his attitude towards the principle of cooperation of maxims.

According to John Stuart Mill (2010:1), Implicatures means “all about one simple idea: that speakers convey information not only by what they say, but also by what they do not say. In other words, the utterances have the meaning by describing more or less meaning, not right or wrong. Sometimes the speakers give the unclear utterances to the hearers because they want to the hearers to interpret the utterances by themselves. Implicature is a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said. In other hand, the speaker intends to communicate is more invisible than the speaker directly expresses.

Horn, (2005:3) as Grice states that what people say and what people mean are often different matters. So that the listener need to understand a knowledge of four maxim that 4 allows listener to draw inferences about the speaker’s intention and implied meaning. The meaning conveyed by speaker and recovered as a result of the listener inferences, is known as conversational implicature. There are cooperative principle of conversation and elaborated in four sub-principle called maxim which defined by Grice such as maxim of quality, maxim of quantity, maxim of relevance, and maxim of manner, Joan Cutting (2002:36).

Based on the concept explained previously, implicature can be defined with the following characteristics: (1) the implication is not stated directly, (2) does not have any absolute relationship with utterances realized, (3) includes extra-linguistic elements, (4) is open interpretation, and (5) occurs due to obedience or disobedience to the cooperative principles in the conversation.

Yule (1996:35) states that Implicature can be considered as an additional conveyed meaning. It is attained when the speaker intend to communicate more than just what the words mean. It is the speaker who totally communicates and the listener recognize those communicated meanings via inference.

Benefits of Implicature :

According to **Levinson (1991: 97-100)**, the concept of implicature in the study of pragmatics has **four** benefits at least:

- a)** Implicature can provide explanations of meaning or linguistic facts unreachable by linguistic theory .
- b)** Implicature can provide a clear explanation of the external differences of what the language user means .
- c)** Implicature can give a simple semantic description of the causal relationship associated with the same conjunction.
- d)** Implicature can describe various facts that outwardly appear unrelated, even opposite (like metaphors).

Grice's Theory of Meaning (Non- Natural meaning) :

Grice's theory of meaning-nn is explained as a theory of communication.

Grice introduced the notion of non-natural meaning or meaning nn (see Grice, 1957). He distinguished natural meaning, for instance a natural phenomenon (e.g. spots in an eruptive illness or smoke) indicating that something is the case (e.g. one's having an eruptive illness or the presence of fire) and non-natural meaning which is typically involved in a communicative process and depends on the intention of the communicator.

More precisely, Grice defined non-natural meaning as due to the intention of the speaker to produce a belief in the hearer through the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention. It is important to note that while natural meaning is **factive** (i.e. if it is true that there are eruptive spots, it is true that the affected patient has an eruptive illness), non natural meaning is not. In other words, it is subject to misunderstandings due to differing points of view. It has the interesting consequence that it gives an account of how communication might be achieved in the absence of any conventional means for expressing the intended message. A corollary is that it provides an

account of how ignore can be communicated, in his rather strict sense of non-naturally meant, than what is actually said.

Obviously we can, given an utterance, often derive a number of inferences from it; but not all those inferences may have been communicative in Grice's sense, i.e. intended to be recognized as having been intended. The kind of inferences that are called implicatures are always of this special intended kind, and the theory of implicature sketches one way in which such inferences, of a non-conventional sort, can be conveyed while meeting the criterion of communicated messages sketched in Grice's theory of meaning-nn. Grice (1957).

Distinguishing between what he calls *natural meaning* (as in Those black clouds mean rain), and *non-natural meaning or meaning-nn* (equivalent to the notion of intentional communication), Grice gives the following characterization of meaning-nn : S meant-nn z by uttering U if and only if:

- (i) S intended U to cause some effect z in recipient H
- (ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognizing that intention (i)

Here, S stands for speaker (in the case of spoken communication; for sender or communicator in other cases); H for hearer, or more accurately, the intended recipient; "uttering U" for utterance of a linguistic token, i.e. a sentence part, sentence, or string of sentences or sentence parts (or the production of non-linguistic communicative acts); and z for (roughly) some belief or volition invoked in H; Such a definition is likely to be opaque at first reading, hut what it essentially states is that communication consists of the 'sender' intending to cause the 'receiver' to think or do something, just by getting the 'receiver' to recognize that the 'sender' is trying to cause that thought or action. So communication is a complex kind of intention that is achieved or satisfied just by being recognized.

In the process of communication, the 'sender's' communicative intention becomes mutual knowledge to 'sender' (S) and 'receiver' (H), i.e. S knows that H knows that S knows that H knows (and so ad infinitum) that S has this particular intention. Attaining this state of mutual knowledge of a communicative intention is to have successfully communicated. Grice's theory explains how there can be interesting discrepancies between speaker-meaning (Grice's meaning-nn) and sentence-meaning . For example, Linguistics is fascinating said ironically may be intended by the speaker to

communicate 'Linguistics is deadly boring'. Further, there appear to be general conventions about the use of language that require (or, perhaps, merely recommend) a certain degree of implicitness in communication, with the consequence that it is virtually ensured that what the speaker means by any utterance U is not exhausted by the meaning of the linguistic form uttered.

In simple words to distinguish between Natural and Non – natural meaning .

Natural vs. Non-Natural Meaning Grice distinguishes between two senses of the expression “means” -- natural meaning and or non-natural meaning (meaning-NN). Natural meaning is also called “indicator meaning”. Non-natural meaning is also called “communicative meaning”.

Natural meaning: This is the kind of meaning something has when it is a natural and reliable sign or symptom of or evidence for something. Natural meaning rests on law-like relationship in the world. Examples of natural meaning:

- Those spots mean measles → Spots must be one characteristic of measles .
- Black clouds mean rain . → There is a natural relation between black clouds and rain .

Non-natural meaning (meaning-NN): This is the kind of meaning distinctive of linguistic expressions and communication. Two kinds:

A- **Conventional meaning** : The standard , literal , or conventional meaning of expression . often the conventional meaning of an utterance and what speaker means in uttering it are the same . But they can come apart . Examples are irony , sarcasm and metaphors ---etc . Such as “Susan drowned in a sea of grief” .

B- **Speaker meaning** : What the speaker means by the expression in a given context . examples

- Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full .→ Conventional not natural .
- The light a top a taxi being means that it is available .

Grice thinks that speaker – meaning is more basic than conventional meaning . The interpretation of non-natural meaning is necessarily a case of

behaviour-explaining, dependent on speaker intentions acting as reasons for the conveyance of speaker meaning .

Test for Non- Natural meaning (Meaningnn) :

1- 1st Test : Entailment

In cases of natural meaning , “X means that P” entails P . So if X naturally means that P , then P must be the case . **Error is impossible** . In cases of Non – natural meaning , there is no such entailment . **Error is possible** .

Examples

- “Those spots mean measles , but has not got measles” is self-contradictory .
- Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full, but the bus is not full – the conductor has made a mistake is not self-contradictory .

2- 2nd Test : Quotation

In cases of natural meaning , the verb “to mean” cannot be followed by a quotation (a phrase in inverted commas” , in cases of meaning nn , it can . Examples

- Those spots mean “he has measles”. No
- Those three rings on the bell mean “the bus is full” . Yes

Types of Implicature :

Grice (1975) divides types of implicature into **two**, they are *conversational implicature* and *conventional implicature*.

a. Conversational Implicature :

The notion of conversational implicature is often the single most important ideas in pragmatics. It is said so since the conversational implicature give some contributions to pragmatics. **First**, implicature stands as paradigmatic example of the nature and the power of pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomenon.

The **second**, important contribution by the notion of implicature is that it provides some explicit account of how it is possible to mean (in some general sense) more than what is actually.

Thirdly, the notion of implicature seems likely to effect substansial simplifications in both the structure and the context of semantic description.

The next contribution of implicature seems to be essential if various basic facts about language are account for properly. **Finally**, the principles that generate implicature have very general explanation power: a few basic principles provide explanation for large array of apparently unrelated facts.

Thomas defines conversational implicature is an implicature that is generated due to the demands of a particular context. In conversational implicature, what is implied is varied based on the context of utterance. Thomas defines Grice's theory of Conversational Implicature wherein Grice attempts to show systematically how a person gets from what is said to what is meant, or from the expressed meaning to the implied meaning. Conversational implicature is a nonconventional implicature based on an addressee's assumption that the speaker is following the conversational maxims or at least the cooperative principle. Conversational implicature is the inference by assuming that speaker and addressee knows and accepts the communicational norms (maxims) (Griffiths, 2006).

A **conversational maxim** is any of four rules which were proposed by Grice, stating that a speaker is assumed to make a contribution that (1) is adequately but not overly informative (quantity maxim); (2) the speaker does not believe to be false and for which adequate evidence is had (quality maxim); (3) is relevant (maxim of relation or relevance), and (4) is clear, unambiguous, brief, and orderly (maxim of manner). **The conversational implicature is also divided into three sub categorizations, they are:**

1. Generalized Conversational Implicature :

Generalized Conversational Implicature is implicature that arises without any particular context or specific scenario is necessary (Grundy, 2000:81-82). In generalized conversational implicature, we can use the **maxim of quantity** to invite the inference that no more can be said, as in:

A: "I wish you buy a bag or shoes".

B: "I buy a bag".

From the illustration above, it means B does not buy shoes. B has bought a bag and it can be understood that the utterance is informative as required the answer for the question arisen by A. **The utterances can be classified into generalized**

conversational implicature since the implicit meaning can be understood by the reader since the context is already given from the question arise.

2. Particularized Conversational Implicature:

Particularized Conversational Implicature is the implicature which needs special contexts. It only can be understood by the listener if the context is provided. Levinson (1983:127) states that all implicatures that arise from observing the maxim of relevance are particularized since utterances are relevant only with respect to the particular topic or issue at hand. Peter Grundy (1995:45) said that particularized implicatures are derived, not from the utterance alone, but from the utterance in context. They vary with the context. Thus, based on the illustration above to identify the particular conversational implicature through observing the maxim of relevance based on its context. Example:

Bert: Do you like ice cream?

Ernie: Is the pope catholic? (Example is taken from Yule, 1996;43)

Ern's response does not provide a „yes“ or „no“ answer. Bert must assume that Erni is being cooperative, so he considers Erni's Pope“ question and clearly the answer is „Yes“.

3. Scalar Implicature :

Scalar implicature basically discussed on the scale of values. Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expresses one value from a scale of values. This is particularly obvious in terms for expressing quantity, as shown in the scales in [1], where terms are listed from the highest to the lowest value. [1] <all, most, many, some, few>

<always, often, sometimes>.

Scalar implicature occurs when producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word from the scale which is the most informative and truthful (quantity and quality) in circumstances, for example;

They're sometimes really interesting.

By using „sometimes“, the speaker communicates, via implicature, the negative of forms higher on the scale of frequency (+> not always, +> not often), which means not always, or not often.

b. Conventional Implicature :

Grice supposed an entirely different kind of non-truth- conditional inferences, namely **conventional implicatures**. Conventional implicatures are non-truth-conditional inferences that are not derived from superordinate pragmatic principles like the maxims, but are simply attached by convention to particular lexical items or expressions. Grice provides just two examples: The word **but** has the same truth-conditional (or truth-functional) content as the word **and**, with an additional conventional implicature to the effect that there is some contrast between the conjuncts (Grice, 1961); The other example is the word **therefore** which Grice holds contributes nothing to the truth conditions of the expressions it occurs within (Grice, 1975: 44). Other examples that have been suggested are the meanings of **even** (Kempson, 1975; Karttunen & Peters, 1979) and **yet** (Wilson, 1975).

Conventional implicatures can be expected to contrast with conversational ones on all the distinctive properties we have outlined for the latter. For example, conventional implicatures will be non-cancellable because they do not rely on defeasible assumptions about the nature of the context; they will be detachable because they depend on the particular linguistic items used (e.g. if you substitute **and** for **but** you lose the conventional implicature but retain the same truth conditions); they will not be calculated using pragmatic principles and contextual knowledge, but rather given by convention (e.g. there is no way that given the truth conditions of **but** you can derive or calculate that there is a contrast between the two conjuncts); they may be expected therefore to have a relatively determinate content or meaning; and there will be no expectation of a universal tendency for languages to associate the same conventional implicatures with expressions with certain truth conditions.

In a sense conventional implicature is not a very interesting concept - it is rather an admission of the failure of truth-conditional semantics to capture all the conventional content or meaning of natural language words and expressions. It is natural, therefore, that the acceptance of the notion has been resisted (see e.g. Kempson, 1975), and that attempts have been made to reduce alleged cases to

matters of entailment, conversational implicature or presupposition. Grice's few examples of conventional implicature encourage the would-be reductionist: indeed Kempson (1975) claims that there are only several candidates for the 10 category anyway. But this is an error, for a very large number of deictic expressions of the sort described in seem to have conventional implicatures as a central meaning component. This is especially true of discourse-deictic items and socially deictic items below (when used in address): However, moreover, besides, anyway, well, still, furthermore, although, oh, so . Sir, madam, mate, your honour, sonny, hey, (Levinson 1983: 127-28) . Example:

Mary suggested black, but I chose white. (Example is taken from Yule, 1996: P. 45).

The conjunction “but” used in the sentence shows that the information between the first and the second clauses are the interpretation of any utterance an implicature of contrast. Other English words such as “yet” and “even” also have conventional implicatures. The conventional implicature of “yet” is that the present situation is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite, at a later time. “And” is a convention of addition or plus., “Even” describe an event of contrary to expectation.

Properties of Conversational Implicatures :

Grice suggests that the essential properties of implicatures are largely **predictable**. He isolates **five characteristic properties** of which the **first**, and perhaps the most important, is that they are **cancellable**, or more exactly **defeasible**. The notion of defeasibility is crucial in pragmatics as most pragmatic inferences, of various different kinds, exhibit this property. An inference is defeasible if it is possible to cancel it by adding some additional premises to the original ones.

Deductive or logical inferences are thus not defeasible . For example, given some logical argument like that in the following example , it is not possible to defeat the argument simply by adding premises no matter what they be:

1. If Socrates is a man, he is mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.

3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

If the two premises 1 and 2 are true, then whatever else is true or false, 3 is true. In this respect implicatures are more like inductive inferences than they are like deductive ones, for implicatures too are inferences easily defeasible (Levinson :114-15). Horn (1972) makes a distinction between two kinds of defeasibility of implicatures : **suspension**, where the speaker is not committed to the truth or falsity of the implicature, and **cancellation**, where the speaker is committed to the falsity of the implicature. So implicatures are defeasible, and can drop out in certain linguistic or non-linguistic contexts. In that respect they appear to be quite unlike logical inferences, and cannot directly be modelled in terms of some semantic relation like entailment (for the contrary opinion see G. Lakoff, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, forthcoming).

The **second** important property of implicatures is that (with the exception of those due to the maxim of Manner) they are, as Grice puts it, **non-detachable**. By this Grice means that the implicature is attached to the semantic content of what is said, not to linguistic form, and therefore implicatures cannot be detached from an utterance simply by changing the words of the utterance for synonyms. There at least appear to be other kinds of pragmatic implication that are attached to the form rather than the meaning of what is said; for example,:

(1) John didn't manage to reach the summit .

(2) John tried to reach the summit .

(3) John didn't reach the summit . So in contrast to implicatures, this particular brand of pragmatic inference (presupposition) does seem to be detachable .

The **third** feature of implicatures is that they are calculable. That is to say, for every putative implicature it should be possible to construct an argument of the type in Levinson's book page (113):

- (i) The conventional content of the sentence (P) uttered
- (ii) (ii) The co-operative principle and its maxims
- (iii) The context of P (e.g. its relevance)
- (iv) Certain bits of background information (e.g. P is blatantly false)

(V) That (i)-(v) are mutual knowledge shared by speaker and addressee.

Showing how from the literal meaning or the sense of the utterance on the one hand, and the co-operative principle and the maxims on the other, it follows that an addressee would make the inference in question to preserve the assumption of co-operation.

Fourthly, implicatures are **non-conventional**, that is, not part of the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. Some reasons for believing this have already been adduced under cancellability (or defeasibility) and non-detachability. But in addition, if Grice is right about the manner in which implicatures come about, then since you need to know the literal meaning or sense of a sentence before you can calculate its implicatures in a context, the implicatures cannot be part of that meaning. In addition we can show that an utterance can be true while its implicature is false, and vice versa, as in:

- (1) Herb hit Sally. which by Quantity would implicate (2) Herb didn't kill Sally by hitting her. (since if Herb had killed Sally, the speaker would, in saying just (1), be withholding information in a non-co-operative way); but a speaker might say (1) nevertheless, attempting to mislead, in a situation where (1) is true, but (2) is false. Finally, and importantly, an expression with a single meaning can give rise to different implicatures on different 12 occasions, and indeed on any one occasion the set of associated implicatures may not be exactly determinable. Consider for example: (3) John's a machine. This could convey that John is cold, or efficient, or never stops working, or puffs and blows, or has little in the way of grey matter, or indeed any and all of these. So implicatures can have a certain indeterminacy in at least some cases, incompatible with the stable determinate senses usually assumed in semantic theories.

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